

AN EXPOSITORY ANALYSIS OF RUDOLF STEINER'S PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM

EMMANUEL ONYEKA OKEKE¹ & IGNATIUS NNAEMEKA ONWUATUEGWU²

¹Department of Philosophy, Bigard Memorial Seminary Enugu, Nigeria

²Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

The need for this work is as a result of a thorough inquiry into the question of freedom especially from the perspective of Steiner. The problematic questions for this critical sojourn are stated as follows: Can man be free? What is the basis for freedom in Man as a thinking being? Does freedom subsist in thought, or action, or in both? Is there limit to what man can 'know' or 'do' as a free thinking being? What are the necessary conditions for the freedom of man? The purpose of this study is geared towards unleashing the potentialities of man, especially with regards to the freedom of thought; for man is what he thinks. Attention shall be paid to the basis of freedom, whereby freedom of thought is freedom in act, the limits of a free thinking being, and the necessary conditions for a free man. Rudolf Steiner's thought on freedom serves as the reference point in this research. These would go a long way to help us enshrine freedom in our present society. In the course of this philosophical research; many philosophical tools will be employed. The methods of Hermeneutics and Analysis would be of great importance.

KEYWORDS: Freedom; Cognition; Presupposition; Assumptions; Percept

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The question of human freedom is very common in the Modern world that its significance seems to worth no penny. We often hear every Tom, Dick and Harry across every nook and cranny laying claim to freedom of some sort. In our present day society, an average teen would find it hard to hide this great urge or thirst for freedom and would not waste a second to act naively like a free creature.

The researcher grew up in a typical African village of the Eastern region of Nigeria, Igbo nation precisely. Within the Igbo - African milieu, the teenagers are often seen as people who don't know the difference between their left and their right by their parents and guardians. Every choice they make is censored and must be in consonance with their parents' or guardians' line of thought. Many children were confined within the ambience of the choices of their guardians or parents that they lost the fragile talents of their childhood. Some who had the opportunity in adulthood to transcend the bias went back to their choices after so many years of inauthenticity and alienation.

The above background is what arose in the researcher the hunger to explore the theme of freedom. Freedom generally can be said to be positive and negative. One is free in the positive sense to the extent that one has control over one's life, or rules oneself (Audi; 1999, p.723). Freedom is close to autonomy or independence. In the negative sense, one is free if one is not prevented from doing something by another person.

In the words of Lipson, Steiner sees freedom as "...a disposition to act both independently and constructively" (Steiner; 1995, p.xv). This disposition can only be achieved through intuitive thinking. It is in overcoming the two

elements of our natural inclination and convention that we can genuinely achieve individualized intuitions that speak to a particular situation at hand. Therefore, we find freedom to think and act by overcoming a slavish and /or automatic response to the dictates of lower drives and conventional morality and also by fostering mediation between objective and subjective elements of our experience (Steiner; 1995, p.154). For freedom does not subsist in acting out everything subjective but in thoughtful and creative action motivated by love. Thereby, avoiding limits stemming from obedience to external moral codes or compulsive physical drives through loving our actions which are distinctively unique and individual to us (Steiner; 1995, p.150).

In the course of this research, we shall expose the notion of freedom as championed by a versatile and great German thinker, Rudolf Steiner. Like many philosophical projections on freedom, the concept has epistemological and ethical perspectives. This research therefore will attempt an exposition of Steiner's philosophy of freedom by making a textual analysis of his main works on freedom, namely: *Truth and Knowledge*, and *Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path*, otherwise called, *The Philosophy of Freedom*.

Background of Rudolf Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom

In his foundational and major philosophical work, *The Philosophy of Freedom*, Steiner made a bold move and determined to propose an epistemic standpoint on the possibility for man to have free thought, and consequently to initiate a new action. This epistemic journey took root in an introductory work to the book. The object of discussion in the nursery work is to analyze the act of cognition with the aim of reducing it to its fundamental elements, in order to enable the correct formulation of the problem of knowledge, and proffer solutions to the problem (Steiner; 1981, p.v). He finds out that the mistake of some of the previous thinkers is that they search for knowledge of the ultimate truths without initially laying a meaningful standpoint by searching for the nature of knowledge. He, therefore, set out to correct the perceived error of his predecessors who, he believes, suffered so much from an unhealthy faith in Kant, who avers that a transcendental ultimate foundation of things are nothing but illusion.

Kant and Epistemological Presupposition

In the book, *Truth and Knowledge*, Steiner took the task of showing that all that is demanded to explain and account for the universe is within the reach of our thinking. He pointed out the necessity of epistemology as foundational to all enterprise, and therefore should be devoid of any kind of presupposition. In his words, "Epistemology provides the foundation for all scientific efforts and can fulfil its functions by making no presuppositions itself, as far as it is possible, about man's faculty of knowledge" (Steiner; 1981, p.1). This criterion is seemingly generally accepted but often neglected by some philosophers for when the better known system of epistemology are more closely examined, it becomes apparent that a whole series of presuppositions are made at the beginning, which cast doubt on the rest of the argument" (Steiner; 1981, p.1). Such a situation is striking and surprising for they were made when the fundamental problems of epistemology are formulated. Accordingly, if the foundation is faulty, the building will be affected; this situation is same in epistemological enquiry. If the essential problems of science are misstated, the right solutions are unlikely to be found (Steiner; 1981, p.1). Thus, a successful epistemological progress is least expected.

Steiner thinks that Kant is guilty of presupposition in his fundamental question concerning epistemology: How are synthetic judgements a priori possible? This is not free of presupposition for it says that "a system of absolute, certain knowledge can be erected only on a foundation of judgments that are synthetic and acquired independently of all

experience” (Steiner; 1981, p.2). He accuses Kant of the bias of not leaving open the issue of arriving at a judgement by way of experience only or by any other way as well. He accuses Kant of two major presuppositions: first presupposition is that we need other means of gaining knowledge besides experience, and the second is that all knowledge gained through experience is only approximately valid (Steiner; 1981, p.2). Kant borrowed this prejudice from dogmatic philosophers and imported it without proof. He makes the assumptions and presumed their validity; what if they are not valid? All the edifices will crumble and his doctrine will have no foundation. Reacting on the criticism of Kant with regards to the starting point of epistemology, Steiner posits:

In reply to these criticisms of Kant's critique of reason, it could be said that every theory of knowledge must first lead the reader to where the starting point, free of all presuppositions, is to be found. For what we possess as knowledge at any moment in our life is far removed from this point, and we must first be led back to it artificially. In actual fact, it is a necessity for every epistemologist to come to such a purely didactic arrangement concerning the starting point of this science. But this must always be limited merely to showing to what extent the starting point for cognition really is the absolute start; it must be presented in purely self-evident, analytical sentences and, unlike Kant's argument, contain no assertions which will influence the content of the subsequent discussion. It is also incumbent on the epistemologist to show that his starting point is really free of all presuppositions (Steiner; 1981, p.5).

Rudolf Steiner's Position on the Starting Point of Epistemology

Many philosophers following in the footsteps of Kant are of the view that the basic principle and starting point of all epistemological systems is that all objects given to us are our representations (Steiner; 1981, p.6). This principle should not have been placed at the foundation of a theory of knowledge; to say that my knowledge extends, to begin with, only as far as my representations, is to express a quite definite judgment about cognition” (Steiner; 1981, p.7). Here is a question begging for answer; how do I come to the knowledge, prior to all knowledge, therefore, that what is given to me are mere representations?

This principle which has become in effect a part of the whole modern scientific consciousness ought not to be placed at the foundation of epistemology. Since the nature of epistemology is critical reflection, it can only be a critical science. Hence, its object is essentially subjective activity of the mind which is cognition and demonstration of the laws inherent in cognition. Naivety of any kind is hereby detested and not tolerated from this prestigious science. The strength of this enterprise Steiner stresses “must lie in doing precisely what many thinkers, inclined more toward the practical doing of things, pride themselves that they have never done, namely, think about thinking” (Steiner; 1981, p.10). In this case, every epistemological investigation must begin by rejecting existing knowledge. The criteria for the starting point of epistemology by Steiner can be seen below:

If a theory of knowledge is really to explain the whole sphere of knowledge, then it must start from something still quite untouched by the activity of thinking, and what is more, from something which lends to this activity its first impulse. This starting point must lie outside the act of cognition; it must not itself be knowledge. But it must be sought immediately prior to cognition, so that the very next step man takes beyond it is the activity of cognition. This absolute starting point must be determined in such a way that it admits nothing already derived from cognition (Steiner; 1981, p.11).

Rudolf Steiner's Theory of Knowledge as Free of Assumptions

One can doubt a theory of knowledge free of presupposition because in practice it may not be possible for man to

experience the world picture in this form. One may never experience a division between the purely passive awareness of the directly-given and a thinking recognition of it. Some of those objections say that the world picture with which we begin philosophical reflection already contains predicates mediated through cognition (Steiner; 1981, p.12). Therefore, to remove from this all that has been contributed by cognition, and to establish a pre-cognitive starting point, can only be done conceptual" (Steiner; 1981, p.12). This is where the act of cognition first appears, where knowledge begins.

At the starting point, the given cannot be treated as a concept with a definitive meaning. It cannot be judged with the yardstick of truth and error because one takes in what is presented to him directly without any cognitive processes. The justification of its definition will not depend on the inherent laws in the act of cognition for the laws can be discovered on the course of epistemological enterprise. One can exclude error wholly by saying:

I eliminate from my world-picture all conceptual definitions arrived at through cognition and retain only what enters my field of observation without any activity on my part. When on principle I refrain from making any statement, I cannot make a mistake (Steiner; 1981, p.12).

It is from here that we progress to inquire into the meaning of cognition. We must find the bridge from the world-picture as given and to the other world-picture which we build up by means of cognition. To find this, Steiner posits; In the sphere of the given there must be something in relation to which our activity does not hover in emptiness, but where the content of the world itself enters this activity" (Steiner; 1981, p.14). In this regards, concept and ideas wear no deception. Our concepts and ideas enter into the sphere of our given with the aid of our own activity. They are giving to us in a form known as intellectual seeing" (Steiner; 1981, p.15). Kant and his predecessors believe not in this because for them, thinking refers only to the object and does not itself produce anything.

In explaining the word-content and reality Steiner made a clear clarification and distinction; thus:

Knowledge therefore rests upon the fact that the world-content is originally given to us in incomplete form; it possesses another essential aspect, apart from what is directly present. This second aspect of the world-content, which is not originally given, is revealed through thinking. Therefore, the content of thinking, which appears to us to be something separate, is not a sum of empty thought-forms, but comprises determinations (categories); however, in relation to the rest of the world-content, these determinations represent the organizing principle. The world-content can be called reality only in the form it attains when the two aspects of it described above have been united through knowledge (Steiner; 1981, p.19).

Accordingly, in the production of knowledge, when both the outer and inner perceptions are given directly to the 'I', which is the centre of consciousness, the 'I' feels the need to discover more in the given than is directly contained in it. When this happens, a second world, the world of thinking, rises up to meet the 'I' and the 'I' unites the two through its own free decision (producing what we have defined as the idea of knowledge) (Steiner; 1981, p.20).

Human Action and the Urge for Knowledge

The idea of freedom of human will has thrown the epistemological enterprise into many groups or divisions. First, there are those who in their moral zeal cast aspersions on the intellect of anyone who denies such a truth so obvious; second, there are others who see the acme of unscientific thinking in the belief that lawlessness of nature fails to apply to the area of human action and thinking (Steiner; 1995, p.5). Steiner observes that there is a common belief and claims that there is always a quite specific reason why a person performs one specific action from among several possibilities" (Steiner; 1995,

p.6). As obvious as the above claim, the present day opponents of freedom direct their principal attack only against freedom of choice, following in the Herbert Spencer's footsteps. The germinal form of this objection is found in the works of Spinoza who sees God as the only free being and all creatures as determined to exist and act in a fixed and precise ways by external causes (Steiner; 1995, p.8). For Steiner, the fundamental error in this is the negligence of the consciousness of man because, Spinoza and all who think like him overlook the human capacity to be aware not only of ones actions, but also of the causes by which one's actions are guided" (Steiner; 1995, p.10). How do decisions arise within a human being since there are many activities humans have in common with other organisms? The answer rests in rational thinking. It is here that man knows the motive of his action and understands his will. With this faculty, human being has an awareness of the reasons for the actions (Steiner; 1995, p.15). "Obviously, my action cannot be free if I, as the actor, do not know why I carry it out. "But what about an action for which the reasons are known?" Steiner asks. He introduces thus, an inquiry on the origin and significance of thinking. This is necessary because when we understand the activity of thinking, it will be easy to clarify the role it plays in human action and concept of the knowledge of our action is possible. Quoting Hegel, Steiner rightly says, "Thinking turns the soul, with which beasts too are gifted, into spirit" (Steiner; 1995, p.16). Therefore, thinking will also give to human action its characteristic stamp; the question regarding the nature of human actions presupposes another which is that of the origin of thinking (Steiner; 1995, p.16).

The Fundamental Urge for Knowledge

Humans are ever insatiable. Nowhere are we content with what nature shows us. We look everywhere and search all places for explanation of facts. We seek things over and above what is given to us. This tendency according to Steiner splits our entire being into two opposite parts: I and World. This is also one of the direct consequences of consciousness through which we setup this barrier. In all these, we never lose the feeling that we belong to this world and that a link exists that connects us to it, that we are creatures not outside, but within, the universe (Steiner; 1995, p.19). As a result, this feeling engenders an effort to bridge the opposition which the whole metaphysical striving of mankind consists in.

Steiner notes that in the history of thought, monistic and dualistic approaches have been taken to address this opposition. While dualism directs its gaze solely to the separation that human consciousness effects between the 'I' and 'the world,' monism directs its gaze exclusively to unity, and seeks to deny or erase the opposites (Steiner; 1995, p.20). In the view of Steiner, neither is satisfactory because:

neither does justice to the facts. Dualism sees spirit (I) and matter (world) as two fundamentally different entities, and therefore it cannot understand how the two can affect one another while monism has attempted three solutions: either it denies spirit and becomes materialism; or it denies matter, seeking salvation through spiritualism; or else it claims that matter and spirit are inseparably united even in the simplest entity, so that it should come as no surprise if these two forms of existence, which after all are never apart, appear together in human beings (Steiner; 1995, p.21).

In calling us back to the beginning of cognition, Steiner emphasises that the fundamental and primal opposition confronts us first in our consciousness (Steiner; 1995, p.25). The 'I' and 'World' disparity exists because we separate ourselves from the native ground of nature and place ourselves as I in opposition to the World Citing the essay of Goethe titled, Fragment on Nature, Steiner writes: We live in her (Nature's) midst and are strangers to her. She speaks with us continually, yet does not betray her secret to us. All humans are within her and she in them" (Steiner; 1995, p.26).

Though, we estrange ourselves from nature: we feel we are in her and belong to her, her activity lives in us. We

are left with no option, as Steiner suggests, than to find our way back to her. To seek out this natural being within us and rediscover the connections, a simple reflection can be of help to us. This can be done by descending into the depths of our own being, to find there those elements that we have saved in our flight out of nature. Through this investigation, we must come to a point where we can say to ourselves in the words of Steiner: Here I am no longer merely I. There is something here that is more than I. (Steiner; 1995, p.26).

Thinking in the Service of Understanding the Word

Here, Steiner points at the important difference between thinking and other activities of the humans. This was begun with detailing the relationship and connection between thinking and observation which he acknowledged is the point of departure of man's spiritual strivings. Accordingly, he posits the contrast between thinking and observation as the most important antithesis for human beings and what precedes all other philosophical antithesis such as idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, I and Not-I, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, conscious and unconscious (Steiner; 1995, p.30). In establishing any principle, one will either show that it was observed somewhere or one must express it in form of clear thought so that anyone can think. Same applies also to other foundational inquiry like first principles and others; for before we engage in any inquiries, we must put things in conceptual form and thinking must be used. Therefore, Steiner is left with no option than to conclude that every philosophical inquiry, presupposes thinking. For without thinking, philosophers who are essentially thinkers cannot gain knowledge. Oberski doubt if we can legitimately use our thinking to gain knowledge if we have not first established what it is and whether it can be trusted to give us such knowledge (Oberski; 2011, p.10).

For observation; as thinking proceeds conceptualization, observation also precedes thinking. It is through observation that we first become aware of anything that enters into the circle of experience. The content given to us through observation are of sensations, perceptions, views, feelings, acts of will, dream and fantasy constructions, representations, concepts and ideas, illusions and hallucinations (Steiner; 1995, p.31). Since through this act of observation we observe and became aware of objects, of anything. When we observe thinks we almost immediately think about the thing, but we do not observe our thinking immediately which will require that one take up a standpoint outside of the activity. Therefore, "it is only after the thinking that one can observe the thinking because unlike other observations, the observation of thinking is a kind of exceptional state" (Steiner; 1995, p.31). When we observe thinking, Steiner believes that we are applying to thinking a procedure that is normal when we consider all the rest of our world-content but that is not normally applied to thinking itself" (Steiner; 1995, p.31). Also, thinking is in such a way that the thinker forgets that he is thinking while doing so (for) what concerns the thinker is not thinking but the observed object of thinking (Steiner; 1995, p.33). Deductively, thinking as an unobserved element of our spiritual life is so because it is based on our own activity in our everyday transcendental living. This makes active production and contemplative confrontation incompatible. One cannot then observe his active thinking.

Steiner also recognized consciousness as the vehicle of thinking but thinking precedes it. For when one wants to understand consciousness, one will make use of thinking. Therefore, before anything else must be understood thinking must be understood. So, to speak about the correctness or falsehood of thinking is meaningless, though one can doubt whether it is used correctly or properly. Therefore, to arrive at anything that causes thinking, one must not leave the realm of thinking (Steiner; 1995, p.48). Steiner, nevertheless, claims the possibility of attaining the levels of intensified awareness, whereby "the thinking activity itself becomes a fully conscious and living experience" (Dahlin; 2009, p.537). It

is in this experience of living thinking that humans can find freedom (Miller; 2020, p.34).

The World as a 'Percept'

Steiner speaking on 'Concept' and 'ideas' acknowledged that they are by-products of thinking. It is through thinking that concept of something and corresponding ideas are formed. Human consciousness connects concept and observation. Human consciousness is the mediator between thinking and observation (Steiner; 1995, p.52). We consider things as objects, and ourselves as thinking subjects. This is because we focus or direct our thinking to what we see. We are conscious of objects; because we direct our thinking to ourselves. We are aware of ourselves, because we have self-consciousness (Steiner; 1995, p.52).

Human consciousness must necessarily at the same time also be self-consciousness, because it is a thinking consciousness. For when thinking directs its gaze toward its own activity, it has before it as its object its very own being, that is, its subject (Steiner; 1995, p.52).

Therefore, it is only with the help of thinking that we define ourselves as subjects and contrasts ourselves to objects. Thinking, therefore, is not a mere subjective activity but beyond subject and object. Thus, the activity we exercise as a thinking being is not merely subjective but it goes beyond it.

When we observe, Steiner argues that we get to notice the external object which he termed Percept (Steiner; 1995, p.54). The percept is still in an organic state devoid of any meaning and still unprocessed. It is through thinking through the vehicle of consciousness that various precepts are joined to form concept. He fails to agree with the view of the naive realist and critical idealist on this. He believed that the "So-called critical idealism cannot be proved without borrowing from naive realism, while naive realism can be refuted only by accepting its own presuppositions, unexamined, in another sphere" (Steiner; 1995, p.70). But we can avoid this great confusion only when we realize that there is something within what could be experienced through perception in ourselves and without in the world. This is something that cannot fall prey to the problems that arise when a mental picture interposes itself between the process and the observing human being. This something is thinking (Steiner; 1995, p.95).

Human Individuality and Limit to Cognition

Each of us has a standpoint from which to view the world. The moment a percept emerges on the horizon of my observation, thinking too, is activated in me and an element of my thought-system—a specific intuition, a concept unites with the percept (Steiner; 1995, p.99).

When the precepts disappears from my field of vision, what remains according to Steiner is my intuition, and the relationship it formed with the precepts which gives rise to a mental-picture. A mental-picture is therefore an intuition related to a specific percept (Steiner; 1995, p.99). It is through this that I can communicate to someone the idea of lion or table or chair even though the person is yet to have a direct experience of them. They may have the idea or the concept but not the mental-picture which is an individualized concept and my experience (Steiner; 1995, p.100). The greater the number of an individualized concept someone has, the richer their experience will be (Steiner; 1995, p.100). There are some persons who are incapable of having a great or good experience: a person lacking intuitive capacity, because they can remember the percept once it is out of sight; one whose ability to think is well developed though perceives poorly because of coarse sensory equipment. In this regard the intuition cannot establish a valid relationship with the specific things; and a

thoughtless traveller or a scholar living in abstract conceptual systems (Steiner; 1995, p.101).

We do not relate a precept only to a concept, that is, objectivity. We equally relate it to our individual subjectivity of which the manifestation of its relation is “feeling, which is in turn expresses as pleasure and displeasure”. From the foregoing, thinking and feeling can be said to correspond to the dual nature of humans as presented by Steiner. Through thinking, we take part in the universal process of cosmos and through feeling; we draw into the confines of our own being (Steiner; 1995, p.101). Steiner explains:

Our thinking unites us with the world; our feeling leads us back into ourselves and makes us individuals. If we were only thinking and perceiving beings, then our whole life would flow past in monotonous indifference. If we could only know ourselves as selves, then we would be completely indifferent to ourselves. It is only because we have self-feeling along with self-cognition, and pleasure and pain along with the perception of things, that we live as individual beings whose existence is not limited to our conceptual relation to the rest of the world, but who also have a special value for ourselves (Steiner; 1995, p.102).

Therefore, since our life is a continual oscillation between our individual existence and living with the universal world process, a true individual is someone who “ reaches highest, with his or her feelings, into the region of ideals” (Steiner; 1995, p.102). Our respective standpoints and origins make us unique. But for a balanced being, oriented as we are toward wholeness, knowledge of things will go hand in hand with education and development of the life of feeling” (Steiner; 1995, p.103).

Steiner, thus, succeeds in establishing that the demanded elements to explicate reality are to be directly drawn from the two spheres of perceiving and thinking. We can see how organized humans are that the total reality initially appears to us as duality which cognition overcomes by composing the thing as a whole out of the two elements of reality (Steiner; 1995, p.104). Accordingly, unlike the dualists, the monistic viewpoint believes that all that is needed to explain a particular world phenomenon cannot be outside the world itself. Anything that prevents one from achieving such an explanation can be only accidental, temporal or spatial limitations or deficiencies in one's organization deficiencies not in human organization in general, but only in our own particular organization (Steiner; 1995, p.107). It follows logically from the concept of cognizing that as elucidated by Steiner, we cannot speak of a limit to cognition. For it is not the business of the world in general but a transaction that each must accomplish for ourselves” (Steiner; 1995, p.108). Therefore, the limits of cognition as a dynamic process are temporary and can be overcome by progress in perception and thinking (Steiner; 1995, p.109).

The Idea of Freedom

Having emphasized the role of thinking, feeling and willing as expressions of human personality, Rudolf Steiner made it a point of duty to aver that both feeling and willing will become a universal world processes to the extent that they relate to thinking, for thinking consists of feeling and willing (Steiner; 1995, p.133). This is very clear and vivid considering that the relation between a concept and a percept is indirectly and objectively considered by thinking about the percept, though this is different when we examine cognition itself or the relationship between human beings and the world through cognition (Steiner; 1995, p.135). Steiner's work, three main aspects of freedom are observed, namely, the origin of freedom, the past (the origin of freedom), enacting freedom in the present, and the future of freedom (re-connecting to the origin) (Sparby; 2016, p.174).

For Steiner, therefore, self-awareness has a great role to play in objective thinking. This explains better his modification of the outer and inner experience by pointing out as an example that our feelings are giving to us naively as outer perceptions. There is an emphasis that we experience our feeling and wills as being more essentially part of us than our thinking which is still a dualistic experience in the sense that it only involves one side of the world. We, thus, experience our feeling together with our perceptions as being more essentially part of us than our thinking which is more basic and natural.

Talking on freedom of the will, Steiner pinpoints a key question which is on how the will to action arises. He describes nature and culture as the two sources of human action that bring forces to bear on our will and soul life (Steiner; 1995, p.154). It is in overcoming the two elements that we can genuinely accomplish individualized intuitions that speaks to an individual situation at hand. Therefore, we find freedom to think and act by subduing a slavish and/or automatic response to the commands of the lower drives and conventional morality and also by fostering mediation between objective and subjective elements of our experience (Steiner; 1995, p.154). Freedom does not subsist in acting out everything subjective but in thoughtful and creative action motivated by love. Steiner suggests we only achieve free deeds when we find an ethically impelled but particularised response to a given situation. Freedom, therefore, does not exclude moral laws but includes them (Steiner; 1995, p.154). When we let our actions be determined by such individualized thought rather than habits, addictions, reflex, involuntary or unconscious motives, freedom is being accomplished.

Steiner calibrates pure thinking into three of:

- Moral intuition, which deals with formulation of individual purposes;
- Moral imagination, which is mapping out creative strategies for realising these larger purposes in concrete situation;
- And moral technique, which is the practical capacity to accomplish what was intended.

Ethically, Steiner's idea of freedom frowns at utilitarian and deontologists notion of morality. Instead, he believes that the highest form of morality exists when one acts in the world through deeds of love realized by means of individually developed and contextually-sensitive moral imaginations. He sees love as the basics for actions Steiner; 1995, p.151). This exemplified in his maxim, to live in love of action, and let live in understanding of the others will" (Steiner; 1995, p.155).

When presented with the case of one who does evil because he/she presumably loves the act, whether their action is of the highest morality; he did well to remind the objectors that we act by way of the compulsion of our natural beings or by way of the compulsion of ethical principles, and that they neither leave us free. When one is free, one must have imbibed an individual insight, a partly situational ethic that arises neither from our abstract principles nor from our bodily impulses. Here arises a deed that is both unpredictable and wholly individual which can be said, by Steiner, to be free (Steiner; 1995, p.153).

Therefore, Steiner's true morality, the ultimate good, is the universal mediated by the profoundly individual and situational which depends upon achieving freedom from both our inner drives and outer pressures, through cultivating our moral imaginations (Steiner; 1995, p.191), which is only possible through moral intuitions.

Following the idea of Steiner's freedom, people must lift themselves out of the prejudices they get initiated into by their family, society, town, nations, religion and other groups. All must eschew all that they inherited from the past that

limits the creative and imaginative capacity to meet the world directly. To be free, all must realise and work on their potential to be unique individual; for everyone is free to achieve freedom. Freedom is not gotten by accident; it is only those who strive consciously towards it that achieve it.

CONCLUSIONS

This work has a dual significance, viz, theoretical and practical. The theoretical aspect serves to add to the body of literatures on the elucidation and interpretation of Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom. Here, through analytical study of the already existing literature on, and personal interpretations of Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom, the essay produces a comprehensive elucidation of Steiner's thoughts on Freedom. This would go a long way to aid all lovers of freedom in their journey to freedom and emancipation.

The practical aspect attempts to apply Steiner's philosophy of freedom to existential realities of man. It looks to serve as a guide to an authentic life, to put one in control of his thoughts and actions, and to make people masters of their fates. It will help in the fight to remove unnecessary epistemic idols and distempers that limit ones potentials, especially in the growth and development of thought.

REFERENCES

1. Audi, R., ed., (1999) "The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
2. Dahlin, B. (2009) "On the Path Towards Thinking: Learning from Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Steiner, " Springer Studies of Philosophy of Education, No: 28.
3. Miller, S. (2020) "Thinking Towards Freedom: Rudolf Steiner's Epistemology and its Consequences for Human Freedom" (Academia.edu: Date accessed, 05/02/2020).
4. Oberski, I. (2011) "Rudolf Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom as a Basis for Spiritual Education?", International Journal of Children's Spirituality, Vol. 16, No:1.
5. Sparby, T. (2016) "Rudolf Steiner's Idea of Freedom: As Seen in the Panorama of Hegel's Dialectic, " Epochè, Vol. 21, Issue 1.
6. Steiner, R. (1995) "Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path: Philosophy of Freedom, trans. M. Lipson, Anthroposophic Press, Inc., New York.
7. Steiner, R. (1981) "Truth and Knowledge", trans. Rita Stebbing, Rudolf Steiner Publications, Inc., Garber Hill Road, Blauvelt, New York.